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The Productivity of Australia’s Railways 
in the 20th Century
by Nick Wills-Johnson
This	 paper	 utilizes	 a	 unique,	 century-long	 dataset	 for	 the	 Australian	 railways	 to	 examine	 the	
productivity	of	Australia’s	railways	over	the	course	of	the	20th	Century.		The	long	timeframe	allows	
one	to	trace	out	the	paths	of	the	many	technical	and	policy	innovations	the	industry	has	experienced.	
The	aim	of	 this	analysis	 is	 to	assist	 in	 framing	a	 focus	 for	 future	 rail	policy	 to	 ensure	 railways	
maintain	a	central	role	in	the	sustainable	future	of	Australian	land	transport.
INTRODUCTION
During the course of the twentieth century, the role of railways in Australia’s transport system has 
changed in ways few could have foreseen.  The evolution of the industry contains important lessons 
for both its own future and for newer industries with similar economic characteristics.  However, 
analysis of the long-term economic trends of the industry has been rare, with contemporary 
economists focusing generally on either end of the century.  This analytical shortfall is partly due 
to a lack of useful data.  This paper utilizes a unique dataset that provides consistent data for the 
operations of Australia’s railways over the course of the twentieth century.  The dataset is currently 
being developed for use as a public resource.1
The second section of this paper provides a brief overview of the historical development of 
Australia’s railways. The third describes the modeling procedures and data used.  The fourth section 
presents the productivity results and a brief analysis.  The last section makes some conclusions and 
policy suggestions based on the past century of productivity growth within the railways.
Australian Railways – History and Status
Australia’s railways began in the 1850s as individual systems in New South Wales, South Australia 
and Victoria, with Western Australia, Tasmania and Queensland following later.  They were designed 
to facilitate the economic development of each of the (then) colonies by providing a land transport 
link, enabling agricultural exports to be transported from the rural hinterland of each colony to its 
major port in each capital city.  They were not designed for future interconnection (even the gauges 
were different), and it was not until 1995 that Australia’s state capitals were all joined by a standard 
gauge system.The capital of the Northern Territory, however, did not join the system until 2002.
The railways were owned and operated by their colonial governments, who often used them as a 
tool of inter-colonial rivalry (see Clark 1908).  At federation, when the six colonies came together to 
form Australia in 1901, attempts to impose more centralized federal regulation on the railways were 
stridently opposed, and the railways maintained their strong intra-state focus throughout most of the 
twentieth century.  They also remained unregulated, being controlled directly by their government 
owners.  Regulation came only in the 1990s, as the railways were privatized.
During the twentieth century, Australia had seven major public rail systems.2  Each state 
government (New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, Western Australia, Tasmania and 
Queensland) owned and operated its own railway, and the federal government operated a railway 
company (named first Commonwealth Railways, and later Australian National) on track which it 
owned in the Northern Territory, in the Australian Capital Territory, in South Australia, and crossing 
the Nullabor Desert into Western Australia.  In the 1970s, the railways of South Australia and 
Tasmania were taken over by the federal government.3 Thus, seven railway systems became five. 
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Figure 1 provides an operational overview of the railways during the twentieth century. They 
were rarely profitable, generally requiring both operational and investment support from their 
government owners. The main reason for this was the railways were not designed primarily for 
profit. Although their managers, the (public servant) railway commissioners who controlled the 
railways for more than 100 years from the 1880s to the 1990s, were required to minimize losses, 
the railways were required to provide a great many unprofitable services such as rural passenger 
and small parcel services. They also remained overstaffed due to the power of their public-sector 
unions.  Railway losses exploded during the 1970s when, as part of government attempts to control 
Figure 1: Historical Snapshot of Australia’s Railways
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inflation, their prices were frozen while the cost of key inputs (fuel and wages) increased sharply. 
These losses created an industry debt of around $3.7 billion (BTCE 1995) by 1984-85, threatening 
the viability of the industry and providing a catalyst for reform. The process of reform was uneven, 
given that each railway was controlled by a different government, but it involved a switch from a 
public-service focus to a more commercial orientation.  Reforms included shedding excess labor 
and non-productive assets, and focusing on niche markets (particularly bulk freight) to improve 
profitability.  The reform process is detailed in the Industry Commission’s (1991) report on the 
railways.  By 1991, the benefits from these productivity reforms had largely been realized, and the 
industry began a process of structural reform. This involved the vertical separation of track and 
signaling infrastructure from train operations in some railways, privatization of other railways and 
third party access to railway-track across the country. See Wills-Johnson (2007) or Everett (2005) 
for overviews of this ongoing process.
The rise of the automobile is clearly related to the postwar decline in passenger kilometers. Each 
of the railways (with the exception of Commonwealth Railways) operated a commuter rail system 
in their state capital cities and it was these systems that suffered the greatest decline. In recent years, 
New South Wales has recovered some of its urban passenger traffic, perhaps due to an increase in 
congestion in Sydney. Freight has exhibited an opposite trend. Most of this is due to bulk minerals 
traffic, most evident in Queensland where coal is the dominant commodity. Overall, railways have 
not kept pace with growing land-freight traffic, ceding market share to trucks.
Australia today has four distinct types of railway systems. The first includes the intra-state 
freight systems, which fan out from each state capital into the surrounding rural hinterland. The 
second is the interstate network, a standard gauge link which runs from Brisbane through Sydney, 
Melbourne and Adelaide to Perth on the West coast, with a second line running North from Adelaide 
to Darwin. The third is a system in the North-West of Western Australia, which is privately owned 
and serves the iron mining industry. This is not connected to the rest of the system.  The final type 
of system is the commuter rail system in each state capital, except Hobart. A map of the Australian 
railway system is available from the Association of Australian Railways (http://www.ara net.au/
railnetwork.htm). Australia shares the experience common elsewhere in the world of railway route 
miles peaking early in the century and declining thereafter. Jefferson (1928) provides a much earlier 
summary, and map, of Australia’s railways.
Figure 1 (continued): Historical Snapshot of Australia’s Railways
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Productivity Measurement and Data
Productivity, in broad terms, measures the efficiency with which inputs are turned into outputs. 
Measures can be either partial, measuring the relationship between change in some inputs and output, 
or total, measuring the relationship between changes in all inputs and output.  Partial productivity 
measures, such as labor productivity, are often easier to calculate.  But they can be misleading 
because they ascribe all output change to changes in a single input, when many inputs may be 
changing at once.  Productivity is a useful measure for business because it focuses on operations 
and thus provides useful information about how a company might improve them.  Productivity can 
be improved by adopting better technology (like diesel locomotives), by changes in the legislative 
environment governing the industry (such as the Staggers Act in the US), or by the firm in question 
changing its business focus to incorporate niche markets to which it is better suited (such as railways 
closing inefficient lines or focusing on unit train traffic).
This section provides a brief overview of the methodology used to construct the productivity 
indices.  It is not intended to be a detailed discussion of the science of productivity analysis (see 
Hulten et al. 2001 for such a discussion) nor of its application in the analysis of railways.  Rather, 
it is a brief description of the methods used here.  This paper builds upon earlier examination of 
productivity in Australian railways, particularly that of Brunker (1992) and Hensher et al. (1992, 
1994).  It also draws methodologically on the quite substantial US literature on railway productivity, 
particularly Caves et al. (1981), Bitzan and Keeler (2003) and Wilson (1997).
This paper contributes to the literature not only because of its focus on Australian railways, 
relatively poorly studied compared to those in the United States, but also because of the long 
timeframe of its analysis.  Railway assets are long-lived, and decisions made by railway managers 
and policymakers can have long-term implications for the industry.  However, owing to the difficulty 
of obtaining consistent, long-term data series, quantitative analyses of the long-term development of 
the industry are rare.  This paper, therefore, fills a useful niche.
Productivity Measurement 
Two approaches to productivity measurement are used in this paper.  The first is the Tornqvist index. 
This index is particularly useful in cases where inputs and outputs change considerably over time 
and is described in detail in Salerian and Jomoni (1994).  It can be described as follows:
(1)   
Where:
TFP = total factor productivity.
R
i
 = the share in total revenue of each of the i outputs.
Y
i
 = the quantity of each of the i outputs produced by the railway in log form.
S
j
 = the share in total costs of each input j.
X
j
 = the quantity of each input j used in production in log form.
The index is given a base of 100 in 1900/01 and annual changes are shown with reference to this 
base.  As Waters and Street (1998) and Hensher et al. (1994) note, the use of an arbitrary starting 
point can be problematic.  Hensher et al. (1994) point out that it makes it difficult to compare one 
railway with another, as each may have had different levels of productivity during the first period. 
Waters and Street (1998) suggest that problems may arise if the base year is not one where cost is 
minimized.  
To allow for a comparison among the railways, I augment the Tornqvist index with another 
index, suggested by Caves et al. (1982) and used in the Australian context by Hensher and his 
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colleagues. This is discussed below. To address the issue of the base year potentially not being 
one where costs are minimized, the Tornqvist index was modified slightly to define all percentage 
changes in total factor productivity from the year in which freight density was maximized, a rough 
proxy for cost minimization. However, in all cases the maximum occurred in the last few years of 
the time period analyzed, meaning a graphical representation of results would change little from 
that given below.
The index developed by Caves et al. (1982), instead of comparing year-on-year, compares each 
year with a base: the average of each variable over the entire dataset. This allows for railways to be 
compared with one another. It can be described as follows (for each railway):
(2)   
Variables are defined as previously, with the addition of a b subscript that refers to the base of the 
relevant variable and the line over selected variables, referring to their arithmetic (in the case of 
cost and revenue shares) or geometric (in the case of input and output amounts) means for each 
railway.4  
Description of the Data
As noted by numerous analysts of railways in Australia (Hensher et al. 1992, 1994, Productivity 
Commission 1999 and BTRE 2006), obtaining consistent data about Australian railways is very 
difficult. This, however, was not always the case. A century ago, the railways were among the largest 
and most important businesses in the country and were government owned. The former made them 
interesting to statisticians, and the latter meant they were forthcoming with data. The Australian 
Bureau of Statistics (ABS), in both its national and state Yearbooks (ABS cat 1301.0 – 1301.6), 
provides a great deal of data on Australia’s railways. Additionally, Rail,	Bus	 and	Air	Transport	
(ABS Cat no 9201.0) and its successor Rail	Transport	Australia	(ABS cat 9213.0) provide some 
information not covered in the Yearbooks.  Moreover, there is reasonable consistency in the data 
presented, at least through 1985 when the Rail	Transport	Australia publication was discontinued. 
This consistency makes the ABS data very useful for long time-series analysis.
The data used in this paper were sourced primarily from the ABS publications mentioned above, 
with some post 1985 data sourced from Hensher et al. (1994) and from a previous study by the author 
(Wills-Johnson 2008). While some work has been done to reconcile data in annual reports and from 
other sources, not all variables have been reliably estimated past the beginning of the 1990s.  For 
this reason, the indices developed go only to 1991-92. All monetary figures have been converted 
from dollars and pounds of the day to 1991 Australian dollars. The data are described below.
Inputs.	Capital: Capital is calculated via a perpetual inventory method (see Brunker 1992). The 
asset base of each railway in 1900-01 forms a base.  Investment and depreciation change the capital 
base year on year.  Depreciation is straight line over 50 years, and investment figures are derived 
from ABS Yearbooks.5 The ABS data on capital refer to fixed capital investment; hence the long 
depreciation period. This is because many railways built, rather than bought, their rolling stock, 
particularly in the earlier decades of the twentieth century.    
Capital costs are calculated as investment per annum multiplied by the five-year moving average 
of the rate of change of CPI per annum plus 3.08%.6 This represents the opportunity cost of capital. 
Hensher et al. (1992, 1994) use an opportunity cost of capital of 7%, which is reasonable for the time 
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period they analyze, but seems less appropriate for earlier decades. The figure of 3.08% represents 
the average from 1969 to 2005 of the difference between the yields on 10 year government bonds 
and CPI growth.7 The Reserve Bank does not publish earlier rates on their website, necessitating 
the use of this average. Government bond rates, rather than commercial interest rates, were chosen 
because the railways were government owned and funded by government debt. A moving average 
was used to smooth the series and because railway debts were typically carried for many years. The 
ad-hoc nature of this cost of capital measure is acknowledged. Some of the Yearbooks, particularly in 
earlier years, publish the actual cost of capital of the railways. However, the series is too inconsistent 
to be used for the whole twentieth century.  
Labor: Labor is calculated as the number of employees per annum. This includes both operational 
and construction staff on the payroll of the railways concerned. The cost of labor is sourced primarily 
from ABS figures on salaries and wages. While all Yearbooks provide data on staff numbers, only 
Western Australia provides a consistent series on salaries and wages for the whole twentieth century. 
However, relative wages among the railways tended to maintain their proportional relationship over 
many years.8 Thus, to estimate salary and wage costs where data do not exist (primarily prior to 
1930, and during World War II), the wages per person for Western Australia were modified to reflect 
the proportional wages of the railway in question (calculated in years where data did exist) and then 
multiplied by the number of employees.
Materials	and	Fuel: This was calculated as total operating expenses minus salary and wage 
costs. Hensher et al. (1992, 1994) separate data from 1971 to 1992 into energy and materials, 
calculating materials in the same way as this paper and using megajoules of energy to account for 
different energy sources.9 In earlier years, reporting in ABS Yearbooks on fuel used and the cost 
of fuel is sporadic. Thus, fuel costs are included with the costs of other materials here. Lacking 
a consistent unit, such as number of workers, the amount of expenditure on materials and fuel, 
expressed in 1991-92 dollars, forms the measure of the quantity of this input.
Outputs.	Freight:	Freight output is calculated as the number of net-tonne-kilometers (ntks) of freight 
per annum.10 New South Wales, Tasmania and South Australia report this figure from 1901, but 
other railways begin later.  All railways except Western Australia and Queensland ceased reporting 
this data for the duration of World War II. All railways for all years in the sample report total train 
kilometers, freight tonnes and freight revenues.  Thus, to calculate ntks for the years and railways 
where they are not reported, econometric models were developed, with total train kilometers, freight 
tonnes and freight revenues as potential independent variables.  Since most of these variables are 
non-stationary, regressions were carried out in first differences, not levels. The first difference 
results were then applied to levels data in years for which data did exist, in order to estimate ntks 
for years where it did not.  With three independent variables, seven regressions are possible. For 
each railway and each block of time, the ability of a given regression to predict accurately was used 
as the means of determining which regression to use to calculate missing values.  In each case, the 
best regressions predicted within a few percentage points of the actual values. Where data existed 
on either side of the gap (for example, the missing war years), the ability of a regression to correctly 
predict ntks after the gap was used. Where the gap was at the beginning (or end) of a time series, 
the ability of a regression to predict within a sample was used as the selection criteria for prediction 
outside the sample.
Passengers: Passenger outputs were measured by passenger kilometers. As with ntks of freight, 
the data series were incomplete.  However, there was a complete series for passenger journeys and 
passenger revenue. It was possible to derive a series for passenger train kilometers using extant 
ABS data. Thus, passenger kilometers, where data did not exist, were estimated econometrically in 
the same manner as ntks of freight above, with passenger train kilometers, passenger journeys and 
passenger revenues forming potential independent variables and regressions being chosen on the 
basis of their predictive ability. In general, passenger kilometers were reported less frequently than 
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ntks of freight. Thus, more of this series had to be estimated econometrically than was the case for 
freight.
Queensland did not report passenger kilometers to the ABS at all, Hence there were no means 
of estimating a regression in first differences specifically for Queensland using an approach like 
that used for freight above.  Thus, Queensland passenger kilometers were calculated on a year-
by-year basis via a cross-sectional ordinary least squares regression, using data from the other six 
railways. For each year, there were three potential independent variables (passenger train kilometers, 
passenger revenues and passenger journeys) and seven potential regressions.  Of the seven, the 
regression with the best result in terms of its Akaike (1973) and Schwarz (1978) information criteria 
was chosen, and the coefficients of this regression were applied to known data for Queensland 
passenger journeys, passenger train kilometers and passenger revenues (as appropriate) to obtain 
a figure for passenger kilometers for a given year. This was done for 1901 to 1977, a total of 539 
regressions.  After 1977, the railways of South Australia and Tasmania became part of Australian 
National, reducing the number of railways from which to draw independent variables from six to 
four. This left too few degrees of freedom for robust OLS estimation, and therefore the predictive 
method using first differences (in the estimated Queensland series from 1901 to 1977) described 
above was used.  
RESULTS
The first results presented are those for the Tornqvist productivity index. Since each railway had 
a different level of productivity in 1900-01, comparisons can only be made inter-temporally for a 
single railway, not across railways. Figures 2 through 8 present this comparison.
Figure 2: Tornqvist TFP Results – New South Wales
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Figure 3: Tornqvist TFP Results – Victoria
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Figure 4: Tornqvist TFP Results – Queensland
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Figure 5: Tornqvist TFP Results – South Australia
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Figure 6: Tornqvist TFP Results – Western Australia
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Figure 7: Tornqvist TFP Results – Tasmania
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Figure 8: Tornqvist TFP Results – Commonwealth Railways and Australian National
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Each of the railways has quite a different history. Some have clearly fared much worse than 
others, with productivity improvements over the century ranging from 25% in Victoria to an almost 
eight-fold increase in Western Australia. However, it is possible to break the century into three major 
periods for all railways.  
Up until the early 1960s, productivity was static, or even falling across the whole industry. 
During much of this period, rail failed to capture growing land transport traffic. It ceded market 
share to trucks, particularly after 1954, when the Privy Council decision in respect of the Hughes and 
Vale case resulted in the deregulation of interstate road transport (see Joy 1964). Some technological 
improvements were made, such as the electrification of Sydney’s passenger trains in the 1920s and 
early 1930s, but these changes did not significantly affect productivity. Then, from the late 1950s 
until the early 1970s, railways replaced steam locomotives with diesel traction, and all experienced 
large increases in productivity.  
Productivity growth either stalled or reversed during the latter half of the 1970s, as governments 
sought to combat inflation by limiting price increases. This not only resulted in large debts, but also 
impacted productivity, as railways sought to reduce costs any way they could.  Victoria and New 
South Wales suffered the biggest losses, some 15%, which was then compounded by a drought in 
Victoria in 1982-83 that reduced grain traffic by two-thirds and productivity by one-quarter.  
The debt crisis in the 1970s forced a major change in government policy during the 1980s, 
shifting from public service to commercial viability. Part of the policy shift was a removal of 
legislation dating from the 1930s, which reserved certain freight traffic to rail in order to ‘protect’ 
the railways from competition for this freight traffic. Freed of such ‘protection’ and subject to 
inter-modal competition, railways responded by focusing on the niches where they could perform 
best. This response happened quickly.  Western Australia provides a clear example of the size of 
productivity gains possible when a railway shifts from a public service to a commercial focus.  In a 
few short years in the middle of the 1980s, it cut 15% of its staff and stopped providing loss-making, 
less-than-container-load services.  The result was a 35% increase in productivity in just three years. 
Australian National and Queensland Rail, given commercial charters in the late 1970s and early 
1980s respectively, had similar experiences. New South Wales and Victoria, which were the last to 
begin reforming, did not see benefits arising until the latter half of the 1980s.
Three points of expected productivity change do not arise; productivity increases during wartime 
were moderate, and productivity did not seem to decrease markedly in response to the Depression. 
The lack of large wartime peaks may be due to capacity constraints.  These existed partially because 
funds for expansion were limited during wartime, and partially because war placed a large strain 
on manpower; Victoria, for example, lost 15% of its staff to the armed forces in the First World 
War.  Also, demand for military traffic tended to be diffuse across the network and transport was 
often required on relatively short notice. This did not allow for the same kind of optimization as 
can be achieved with steady mineral haulage. The lack of a trough in the Depression may be due 
to government policies to reserve freight traffic for rail, as well as railway construction projects to 
reduce unemployment. Thus, while output declined, it perhaps did not decline by as much as might 
have been expected without such policy intervention.  
The major distinguishing feature between railways in terms of their productivity in the post-
war years appears to be whether they hauled minerals or not.  Export coal in New South Wales 
and Queensland and iron ore and alumina in Western Australia allowed these railways to reap 
considerable benefits through the use of unit trains.11 Queensland provides the starkest example. 
Without coal, it is not clear whether Queensland’s railways, less than half as productive in the early 
1960s as they had been in 1900, would have survived. With coal, they became the most productive 
in the country by 1991.
Minerals traffic, however, was not a necessary requirement for productivity growth, as the 
history of Commonwealth Railways and Australian National shows. This railway, apart from some 
iron ore in the Northern Territory in the late 1960s and early 1970s and some coal in South Australia, 
had limited minerals traffic. Its productivity gains came from two sources. First, it was a long thin 
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railway, with the link across the Nullabor Desert in particular providing an opportunity where it could 
compete very well with trucks for intermodal haulage. Second, successive federal governments were 
determined to use it as a vehicle with which to introduce innovation to the Australian rail industry. 
This was particularly the case in the late 1970s and 1980s, when the commercial focus of the railway 
allowed it to recover relatively quickly from the absorption in 1978 of Australia’s least productive 
railways, Tasmania and South Australia.  
From 1918 to 1939, productivity in most railways trended downwards. In part, this was due 
to the early rise of the trucking industry, using surplus war materiel and operated by returning 
servicemen. Additionally, the Depression of the 1930s reduced demand for services. South Australia, 
however, experienced a very sharp drop in productivity in the mid 1920s.  In 1923, William Webb, an 
American, was employed as the Commissioner of the South Australian railways. Webb immediately 
embarked upon a major program of reform and modernization. This reform, which Webb made 
little effort to sell to local stakeholders, was both very costly and deeply unpopular (Jennings 1990). 
The high costs associated with new capital purchases and upgrades led, unsurprisingly, to a drop in 
productivity in the middle of the decade, as the railway became over-capitalized.  Webb managed to 
offset some of this productivity loss through the application of improved operating procedures during 
the latter part of the decade, but when he left office in 1930 these unpopular management reforms 
were immediately reversed. With expensive infrastructure additions, but without the operational 
procedures to make best use of them, South Australia’s railways stagnated for almost 50 years.
Other railways also experienced sharp shocks.  In most cases, these were due to changes in 
grains traffic.  For example, 1967-68 was a good harvest across Australia, and 1982-83 was a poor 
harvest in Victoria.  Strictly speaking, these demand-side shocks represent productivity gains (or 
losses), as the same inputs are used to produce more (or less) output. However, they are essentially 
random shocks and are not related to the operational decisions of the railways themselves. As such, 
they are dissimilar to deliberate productivity improving measures, such as the adoption of diesel 
locomotives. 
The second piece of productivity analysis follows the methodology of Caves et al. (1981), and 
allows one to compare across railways, as well as across time. Figure 9 shows the result.
Even as most railways experienced upward trends in productivity, particularly during the 
latter half of the twentieth century, their relative performances changed substantially.  In particular, 
Queensland’s railways began and ended the century the most productive in Australia, but slumped 
substantially for much of it.  Prior to the export coal haulage of the 1960s, freight traffic was 
mostly agricultural and largely comprised of relatively short hauls to numerous regional ports. This 
contrasts with the railway systems of the other states, which were focused around the capital cities 
of each state and thus had greater opportunities to capture economies of density. The nature of 
freight traffic in Queensland made it particularly susceptible to competition from trucking. Western 
Australia experienced a similar issue after World War II, when the large network of relatively light-
weight rail lines opened in the 1920s to promote agricultural development and began to impact 
substantially on the ability of the railway to compete against trucks. In the mid 1950s, many of these 
lines were closed and productivity began to increase rapidly, assisted by dieselization, which began 
soon after.  
New South Wales and Victoria have similar productivity histories through the early 1960s, 
when export coal haulage began to become more important in New South Wales. From that date, 
Victoria, which had begun the century as the second most productive railway, performed relatively 
poorly and ended the period as the least productive railway by a considerable margin. In part, this is 
due to its reliance on agricultural traffic, which is very susceptible to drought (as in 1982-83) and to 
limits in the availability of agricultural land.  
Although each railway has exhibited different histories, the general trend for all of them, with 
perhaps the exception of Victoria, has been an increase in productivity, particularly in the period 
after World War II.  This was underpinned first by technical progress and the rise of bulk minerals 
haulage, and later by improved government policy towards railways, allowing them to be operated 
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as commercial businesses rather than public service organizations and arms of government transport 
policy.  
CONCLUSIONS 
From the analysis above, four lessons for the future sustainability of railways seem particularly 
clear.  The first of these is that technical change clearly matters. If Australia’s railways were still 
steam- driven, they could not hope to reach the levels of productivity seen today.  However, not all 
technical progress improves productivity.  Sydney began electrifying its suburban railways in the 
1920s, but this seems to have had little influence on the productivity of the railways of New South 
Wales, despite the very large passenger traffic of Sydney.  Thus, technical change would appear 
more successful when focused on parts of the railway business where economic drivers are more 
important.
Second, increases in traffic increase economies of network density and can thus improve 
productivity, as the experience of minerals traffic clearly shows. However, simply piling more 
freight onto rail will not necessarily make it more productive. The massive increases in traffic 
during the two World Wars had a relatively limited impact on productivity. In part, this is because 
the infrastructure was already stretched when the war began; the track and signaling infrastructure 
was aging and the lack of comparable gauges hampered the degree to which rolling stock could be 
shared across the nation to meet localized increases in demand associated with war traffic. The type 
of freight also matters. Moving troops and tanks around to disparate locations does not provide the 
same economies of scale as moving large amounts of ore in unit trains from a mine to a port. As 
policymakers consider ways in which to move freight onto rail, the type of freight for which they 
intend to induce modal shift and the degree to which the rail infrastructure has the spare capacity 
to absorb it (particularly without adversely influencing other, perhaps more productive rail traffic) 
should be foremost in their considerations.  
Third, government policy can both help and hinder the railways.  Policies to reduce inflation 
during the 1970s were clearly deleterious to the productivity of the railways.  Arguably, the decision 
in the 1930s to reserve freight to rail also had a negative impact on the productivity of the railways, 
for it removed from them the useful force of inter-modal competition and their productivity growth 
suffered as a result.  By the same token, the policy decisions of the late 1970s and early 1980s to force 
the railways onto a more commercial footing and expose them to the rigors of competition clearly 
had a major positive impact on their long-term productivity growth.  As a general rule, policy which 
aims to move the railways towards what they do best as a business (rather than as a public service) 
and which exposes them to the consequences of any poor business decisions they might make, has 
the most beneficial effect on the productivity they are able to attain.  Policy which supports other 
non-commercial goals seems less likely to assist the railways improve their productivity.     
Finally, the experiences of Webb in South Australia in the 1920s highlight the importance 
of stakeholder management, particularly if change is rapid, costly and far-reaching.  Without it, 
endeavors to improve productivity may have precisely the opposite effect.  Although railways are no 
longer as crucial as they were in Webb’s time, they still play an important role in the public psyche. 
While industry analysts appreciate and advocate the use of the most efficient transport mode for each 
transport task, politically, policies which shift freight from road to rail are invariably popular with 
the general public (who might otherwise have to share roads with large trucks), and policies which 
close passenger railways are invariably unpopular.  Policymakers who focus solely on efficient 
operation without effective stakeholder management, like Webb, might similarly discover that rail 
is an industry where good ideas are necessary but not sufficient enough to ensure a sustainable 
future. 
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Endnotes
The database will be made available on CRAE’s website (http://www.cbs.curtin.edu.au/index.1. 
cfm?objectid=9BD9DE7E-AAD5-1667-915D15A829680C3E), and inquiries concerning it 
can be made to the author.
There were also numerous private lines early in the century, often created as light railway 2. 
lines to haul timber.  Of these, the two-foot gauge sugar railways of Queensland are the only 
significant survivors (see http://www.lrrsa.org.au/index.html).  In the 1960s, development of 
iron ore deposits in the Pilbara region in the North West of Western Australia facilitated the 
creation of 2,000 km of private rail track in the region devoted solely to hauling iron ore from 
mine to port.  This is now the largest haulage task in Australia, comprising almost half of 
total freight traffic, and the railways themselves are the most efficient heavy haulage railways 
in the world.  They have been subject to considerable controversy in recent years as a new 
entrant in the region (Fortescue Metals Group) has sought access to the lines of the incumbents 
(BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto) under Australia’s third part access provisions.  The website of 
the National Competition Council (see http://www ncc.gov.au/sector.asp?sectorID=23&page=) 
provides details of this process and also about the railway operations of the Pilbara region.  The 
iron ore railways are not included in this paper because they are operated by the incumbents as 
part of the iron ore production chain, offering no services to shippers.  There is thus no publicly 
available data on their operating costs with which to calculate their productivity.
In Figure 1, one can see a sharp drop in route miles, and in the asset base figures in the late 3. 
1970s associated with this takeover.  The process of takeover also influenced the productivity 
of the Tasmanian and South Australian railways, as they divested non-performing assets ahead 
of the takeover.
Geometric means are used in the latter case because the log of the geometric mean is the 4. 
arithmetic mean of the log-transformed data.  Thus  and 
similarly for X.
Depreciation is more properly based upon asset usage than time.  However, there are insufficient 5. 
data to be able to implement this approach rigorously.
Where CPI has decreased from year to year, the CPI increase is set to zero.6. 
See http://www rba.gov.au/Statistics/Bulletin/index html F Tables.7. 
If one indexes wages for each year using one of the railways as base (in the years where all 8. 
railways have data), the variance of these index numbers over time for a given railway is less 
than 1% of the mean (except in the case of Queensland, where it is 3%), suggesting each 
distribution is narrow, hence the proportional relationships between railways are roughly 
constant over time.
A gallon of diesel fuel contains roughly 146 megajoules of energy.9. 
One metric tonne is 1.102 US tons.  I use the Australian spelling here to ensure no confusion in 10. 
the units of measurement.
New South Wales had always hauled coal, but coal exports began to take off during the 1960s.11. 
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